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The Cost of Non-Compensable Workplace Harm
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The achievement gap between men and women in the workplace
1
in 2013 is real. Women earn less money than men and continue to lag
2
in positions of power and prestige. Though women continue to enter
3
the workplace in greater numbers and are more welcome in the
4
workplace than ever, men continue to enjoy better prospects in the
5
workplace than women. Why the achievement gap persists given how
6
far working women have come since the 1960s seems a mystery. An
achievement gap seems at odds with the progress made over the nearly 50 years since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII). However, Title VII’s continued enforcement is not
inconsistent with a gender achievement gap because Title VII has a
coverage gap. Title VII does not cover all workplace behavior that

*
Professor of Law, University of Richmond. Professor Chambers wishes to thank all
involved with the planning and execution of the Symposium.
1
See MADELEINE M. KUNIN, THE NEW FEMINIST AGENDA 182-87 (2012) (discussing the
gender wage and achievement gap). However, some argue that the gap is closing or has closed.
See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Deliverable Male, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 733, 737-38 (2011) (discussing claims of a diminishing gender pay gap).
2
See Debra Barbezat, Occupational Segregation Around the World, in WOMEN, FAMILY
AND WORK 177, 191 (Karine S. Moe ed., 2003); THOMAS A. KOCHAN, RESTORING THE
AMERICAN DREAM 20 (2005) (discussing gender wage gap). The Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 84,
113th Cong. (2013), is an attempt to help resolve the gender wage gap.
3
See KOCHAN, supra note 2, at 17-18 (noting the continued increase of women in the
workforce); KUNIN, supra note 1, at 6; Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 734.
4
See The Harried Life of the Working Mother, PEW RES. SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
PROJECT (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2009/10/01/the-harried-life-of-theworking-mother/ (discussing changing attitudes toward working women and working mothers in
the last few decades).
5
See KOCHAN, supra note 2, at 20 (noting a gender promotion gap); JOAN C. WILLIAMS,
RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE 15 (2010) (noting that women may still experience a
promotions glass ceiling).
6
See Joyce P. Jacobsen, The Human Capital Explanation for the Gender Gap in Earnings,
in WOMEN, FAMILY AND WORK 161-74 (Karine S. Moe ed., 2003) (noting that the existence of
the gender gap is somewhat of a puzzlement for economists).
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can harm women’s advancement in the workplace. Consequently, if
women are more likely to be subjected to non-compensable workplace behavior that can harm an employee’s achievement than men
are, Title VII’s coverage gap makes the gender achievement gap pre8
dictable.
Title VII has helped women in the workplace, but it does not cure
all workplace ills. Passed, in part, to provide equality for women in
9
the workplace, Title VII bars sex discrimination. However, Title VII is
an employment statute that focuses on harm to employment, and primarily on harm to an employee’s compensation, or terms, conditions
10
or privileges (TCP) of employment. Remedying discrimination that
harms an individual’s TCP of employment is important, but does not
address the full range of behavior that can harm an employee’s employment or advancement. Title VII covers a broad spectrum of employment discrimination, but does not compensate for various forms
of workplace harm that may stop an employee from reaching the em11
ployee’s potential.
Title VII’s coverage gap has been made broader by judicial interpretations of Title VII. Courts are not necessarily hostile to Title VII.
However, some may interpret Title VII narrowly precisely because
12
Title VII’s language explicitly bars only some workplace harm. For
example, though sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII,
courts have interpreted Title VII to cover some, but not all, sexually
harassing workplace conduct. Sexually harassing conduct that is not
severe or pervasive enough to affect an employee’s TCP of employ13
ment is not covered.
Indeed, even when courts deem Title VII to cover some workplace behavior that may not affect an employee’s TCP of employment
explicitly, Title VII typically will not be interpreted to cover all behavior that can harm an employee. For example, retaliation may be ac7
Title VII is the focus of this short essay, though the point applies to the broad range of
employment discrimination statutes.
8
See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and
Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 747–48 (2001) (noting Title VII’s coverage gap).
9
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
. . . to discriminate against an individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .”).
11 See Jonah Gelbach, Jonathan Klick & Lesley Wexler, Passive Discrimination: When
Does It Make Sense To Pay Too Little?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 824-26 (2009) (noting Title VII’s
general limitations).
12 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (noting that Title VII is
not supposed to be a “civility code” that makes every workplace slight actionable).
13 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (discussing requirements for
actionable sexual harassment).
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tionable under Title VII, even when it does not explicitly alter the TCP
of an employee’s employment. However, retaliation that may harm
an employee will not be covered by Title VII if it is deemed insufficiently severe to deter an employee from challenging an unlawful em14
ployment practice. Though the harms from uncovered retaliation
may damage an employee’s productivity or impair an employee’s advancement, Title VII does not address that conduct. Whether or not
the courts are correct in their interpretations of Title VII, those interpretations suggest that substantial non-compensable workplace harm
exists. If non-compensable workplace harm is visited on women more
often than on men, a persistent achievement gap should be expected.
In addition to limiting Title VII’s substantive reach, courts have
limited Title VII’s effective coverage through procedural rulings. The
courts have shaped proof issues that make victory more difficult for
Title VII plaintiffs. For example, courts grant summary judgment in
15
cases that ought to be determined by a factfinder. These decisions on
procedural issues are not designed to harm women, but they effectively limit Title VII’s remedial scope. Again, if workplace behavior tends
to harm women more than men, the judicial response helps to explain
the achievement gap.
This essay briefly addresses the limited fashion in which Title VII
remedies sex discrimination in the workplace. Those limitations fall
into three broad categories. The first encompasses how courts have
applied procedural rules to Title VII claims. The second involves Title
VII’s explicit limitation on its coverage. The third includes substantive
limitations that courts have placed on causes of action that are clearly
covered by Title VII. This essay addresses those categories in turn.
II. PROCEDURAL RULES AND TITLE VII UNDERENFORCEMENT
Procedural rules can effectively limit Title VII enforcement and
leave some workplace discrimination non-compensable. For example,
federal courts effectively use summary judgment to rid the court system of employment discrimination cases they believe are relatively
16
weak. By applying or misapplying the Supreme Court’s summary
judgment jurisprudence to employment discrimination cases, courts
are eliminating winnable employment discrimination cases. Some of
those cases will involve a claim of unlawful discrimination that a court
14

See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Recapturing Summary Adjudication Principles in Disparate
Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. REV. 103 (2005).
16 Scholars have suggested this for years. See generally, id.; Ann McGinley, Credulous
Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and
ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203 (1993).
15
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deems difficult to prove, though likely not impossible to prove to a
17
jury’s satisfaction. If women tend to be more subject than men to
discrimination that is dismissed because courts deem it difficult to
prove, the subsequent underenforcement of Title VII will tend to help
explain an achievement gap.
When used properly, summary judgment resolves cases that do
not need to be heard by a jury because there is no role for the jury.
Summary judgment is appropriate when a case has no issues of mate18
rial fact for which a jury’s wisdom is required. In such cases, a trial is
unnecessary because there is no dispute regarding the facts that mat19
ter to the ultimate decision. In such a case, a reasonable jury could
reach only one conclusion, whether for the plaintiff or the defendant.
Similarly, cases that are proper for summary judgment should not re20
quire the weighing of evidence. If evidence is to be weighed, a jury is
21
Lastly, cases that are proper for summary judgment
necessary.
22
should not require credibility determinations. If credibility determi23
nations need be made, a jury is necessary. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the jury has no role to play.
When used improperly, summary judgment disposes of cases that
24
should be decided by a factfinder. Rather than limit summary judgment to cases where juries can serve no role, some courts have decided that relatively weak cases that would seem to require that
17 However, even weak cases should survive summary judgment. See Wirtz v. Kan. Farm
Bureau Servs., Inc. 274 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1202 (D. Kan. 2003) (“The policy disfavoring pre-trial
disposition of employment discrimination claims makes it difficult for the court to grant summary judgment even in what appears to be this relatively weak case.”).
18 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”).
19 When a case could be decided in either party’s favor, summary judgment should not be
available. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“More important for
present purposes, summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’
that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.”).
20 See id. at 255.
21 Id. at 249 (noting that judge should not weigh evidence when deciding summary judgment).
22 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552-53 (1999) (noting the inappropriateness of making credibility determinations at summary judgment stage).
23 See Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The High
Court Muddies The Evidentiary Waters In Circumstantial Discrimination Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REV.
385, 433-34 (1994) (noting the need to leave credibility determinations to juries in employment
discrimination cases).
24 See Sheriff v. Midwest Health Partners, P.C., 619 F.3d 923, 930-31 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing sufficiency of evidence in sexual harassment case); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of
Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 753 (2007)
(discussing possible improper use of summary judgment in employment cases).
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factfinders make inferences that the judge is unwilling to make should
25
be disposed of without being tried to a jury. This may result from
twisting the suggestion that summary judgment is appropriate in cases
where no reasonable jury could properly find for one of the parties to
mean that summary judgment is appropriate whenever a judge believes that a case is so weak that a reasonable jury will likely find for a
particular party. Given that federal judges may analyze cases differently than juries, summary judgment would seem particularly prob26
lematic in some such cases. What appears to be a relatively weak
case to a federal judge may not be a weak case when presented to a
jury.
An approach to summary judgment that allows judges to analyze
inferential evidence at the summary judgment stage may have an outsized effect in the employment discrimination area. Employment discrimination cases often require that factfinders make inferences, in
27
part, because discrimination is often not explicit. Inferences based
on circumstantial evidence may be just as powerful as conclusions
28
based on direct evidence. However, if courts weigh evidence and
conclude that circumstantial evidence tends to be weaker than direct
evidence, they may dispose of too many cases on summary judgment.
A court that decides that a case it believes to be weak should leave
the system may be more likely to end a meritorious case in the employment discrimination area than it would be in other areas of the
law where inferences may be less likely to be at the core of a case.
The structure of many Title VII cases may make them particularly
susceptible to summary judgment in courts skeptical of inferential
29
proof of discrimination. In McDonnell Douglas v. Green , the Supreme Court provided the basic three-part structure of a typical Title
VII case to address issues related to inferential evidence in Title VII
30
The familiar three-part structure begins with a plaintiffcases.
25 Chambers, supra note 15, at 111-14 (discussing quantum of evidence courts have required that non-movant produce to avoid summary judgment).
26 See Theresa M. Beiner, Let The Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791 (2002).
27 For articles discussing unconscious discrimination, see Melissa Hart, Subjective
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987); Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV.
1431 (2012).
28 See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (ruling that either direct or circumstantial evidence could be sufficient to support a discrimination verdict for plaintiff).
29 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
30 For a detailed discussion of the McDonnell Douglas three-part test, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60
ALB. L. REV. 1 (1996).
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employee proving a prima face case that provides a factual basis from
which a factfinder can infer discrimination. That step is followed by
an articulation of non-discriminatory reasons by the defendantemployer that provides a basis for the factfinder to decline to infer or
to reject discrimination as a cause of the adverse employment action.
The pretext stage is the final part of the test. During that stage, the
employee can present evidence that would allow the factfinder to infer that discrimination, not the reasons proffered by the employer, is
the real reason for the adverse job action. Pretext assumes that if the
employer has no reason for the employment action, a factfinder can
infer that discrimination caused the employment action.
The McDonnell Douglas test has undergone changes since its inception. Indeed, the test arguably is now nothing more than a structure that guarantees that the factfinder analyzes the precise role that
31
discrimination played in the adverse employment decision. However, the core of the test—the employee’s presentation of evidence from
which the factfinder may infer discrimination—has not changed.
What arguably has changed is the skepticism of judges toward discrimination claims.
That skepticism has been on display since the Supreme Court de32
cided St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks. In that case, the Court decided that even after an employee has convinced a factfinder that the
reasons an employer has given for its job action is false, a factfinder
can still find for the employer based on vaguely stated non33
discriminatory reasons. At least since Hicks, and arguably well before, courts have felt free to question how much proof is necessary or
sufficient to allow a factfinder to infer discrimination. Indeed, Hicks
arguably ushered in an era in which courts are allowed to require that
a plaintiff have very good evidence of discrimination before the court
34
will allow a case to survive summary judgment. When such skepticism meets a summary judgment standard that has been applied to
eliminate weak but winnable cases, the result is fewer successful cas-

31 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000) (suggesting
that the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting structure becomes irrelevant once the parties have
presented their cases).
32 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
33 See id. at 542 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the Hicks majority allowed a factfinder
to credit a reason that had not been articulated by an employer to defeat a discrimination claim).
34 Indeed, some courts require substantial evidence before allowing a plaintiff to prevail.
For a discussion of courts that ignore or dismiss significant evidence that ought to support an
inference of discrimination, see Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking In Strays: A Critique of the Stray
Comment Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149 (2012).
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35

es. The result is a jurisprudence that limits winning cases to strong
cases. When weak but winnable cases are declared to be losers before
they can be argued to a jury, the discrimination underlying weak but
winnable cases will tend to go unpunished. If that discrimination
tends to harm female employees more than male employees, a sexbased achievement gap is no surprise.
III. EXPLICIT LIMITATIONS ON TITLE VII’S COVERAGE
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a civil rights statute; Title VII is
the employment discrimination portion of the statute. Consequently,
Title VII addresses workplace discrimination that causes harm to an
employee’s employment. Title VII, inter alia, prohibits sex discrimination by an employer when that discrimination affects the TCP of an
36
employee’s employment. Discriminatory workplace behavior that
does not directly affect an employee’s TCP of employment or compensation usually cannot be redressed by Title VII. Similarly, behavior
that cannot be clearly defined as sex discrimination, but which may be
related to sex, may be non-compensable. These explicit limitations
embedded in Title VII reflect a coverage gap that may help explain
the gender achievement gap.
Discrimination regarding activities that could be important to an
employee’s advancement may not be covered by Title VII. Advancement in the workplace may depend on access to activities that build
workplace camaraderie, engender familiarity among staff, signal that
an employee is a team player, and provide face time with an employer’s decision-makers. Invitations to meals, trips with high-level managers, and other activities may be opportunities for employees to get
to know managers in a manner that will become relevant when discretionary decisions regarding advancement are made. These “reindeer
games,” as Professor Theresa Beiner has called them, can become
37
quite important to an employee’s advancement. They also are generally not covered under Title VII, even when the opportunities are pro38
vided discriminatorily. Shutting women out of the reindeer games
may not violate Title VII because not sharing those opportunities

35 See Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus
Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 301–02 (2006) (discussing
grants of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases).
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
37 See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, Conditions, or Privileges of Employment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643 (1996).
38 When the reindeer games create a hostile work environment, they should be actionable.
See id.; Tristin K. Green, Discrimination In Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003).
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equally with women may not qualify as sex discrimination with respect to an employee’s TCP of employment. However, when those
reindeer games become part of a decision-making process that limits
an employee’s advancement, non-compensable discrimination—the
refusal to provide equal access to reindeer games—may harm an em39
ployee’s advancement. When the discriminatory limitation on participation in reindeer games falls more heavily on women, it can help
perpetuate the achievement gap.
The coverage gap even extends to substantive discrimination. Title VII covers sex discrimination, i.e., behavior that occurs because of
40
sex. However, Title VII does not necessarily cover behavior that oc41
curs because of some characteristic that is merely related to sex. For
example, pregnancy discrimination was deemed not covered by Title
42
VII in the mid-1970s. Title VII was amended in 1978 to make clear
that pregnancy discrimination was to be considered sex discrimina43
tion. Somewhat similarly, the debate about sexual orientation discrimination continues. Sexual orientation discrimination is related to
sex discrimination. However, courts have determined that sexual ori44
entation discrimination is not sex discrimination under Title VII.
A focus on whether conduct is “pure” sex discrimination can be
problematic when behavior is related to sex but can be thought not to
be “pure” sex discrimination. For example, behavior that is not explicitly sexually discriminatory, but could have been influenced by sex,
may not be considered sex discrimination under Title VII. If such behavior becomes a factor in a discretionary decision that harms an employee’s TCP of employment, the employee may be without recourse.
How some courts have addressed animus illustrates the point.
An employee who is disliked by an employer and is therefore
passed over for a promotion may not have a claim under Title VII, if
the animus is personal. Conversely, if the animus is fueled by the em39 However, this could be deemed the use of discretion that damages women’s advancement prospects rather than an attempt to do so. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Wal-Mart
Stores v. Dukes: Lessons for the Legal Quest for Equal Pay, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 229, 258-59
(2012) (discussing discretionary promotions policy in Wal-Mart v. Dukes litigation).
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
41 However, Title VII can be interpreted to cover circumstances where considerations of
sex are part of a larger employment decision. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989) (ruling that employment decision based on sex stereotyping can constitute sex discrimination under Title VII); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (ruling that employment rule that disqualifies women with school-age children from job that men with school-age
children can hold is discriminatory).
42 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
43 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
44 See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3rd Cir. 2009); Medina v. Income
Support Div., New Mexico, 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005).
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45

ployee’s sex, it is sex discrimination. Though making that distinction
may be difficult, some courts seem to suggest that differentiating per46
sonal animus and discriminatory animus can be relatively easy. In
those courts, an employer/supervisor who displays animus toward a
female employee and harms her TCP of employment as a result cannot be found liable under Title VII for those actions unless the animus
47
is proven to be sex-based. Proving to such courts that an individual
employment decision hinged on sex-based animus may be difficult
without significant additional evidence of sex-based animus. Unfortunately, judges who are skeptical of employment discrimination cases
may dispose of cases that lack additional evidence on summary judgment even when a jury might infer that the animus is sex-based. Of
course, if the animus really cannot be proven to be sex-based, a judgment for the employer may be proper under Title VII. Nonetheless, if
women are more likely to be subject to generalized animus in the
workplace, the inability to rectify that animus may help explain an
achievement gap that Title VII does not and will not fix.
Title VII has been of great value to women and to the workplace
in general. It covers a significant amount of workplace discrimination.
However, it explicitly does not bar all workplace discrimination or all
behavior that can limit or harm an employee’s advancement in the
workplace. If women remain more likely to be subject to unlawful
discrimination and to lawful discrimination that is not addressed by
Title VII, men will tend to progress in the workplace more quickly
than women of the same skill. That can help explain and perpetuate
the gender achievement gap in the workplace.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS ON TITLE VII CAUSES OF ACTION
As the prior section suggests, Title VII’s scope is limited by its explicit terms. However, in some instances, courts have interpreted Title
VII in a manner that limits recovery even when its explicit terms
might allow recovery. Two such areas are sexual harassment and retal-

45 In an era of unconscious bias, the distinction between personal animus and discriminatory animus can be difficult to make. See Eva Paterson, Kimberly Thomas Rapp & Sara Jackson,
The Id, The Ego, And Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building Upon Charles Lawrence's
Vision to Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 118788 (2008) (discussing unconscious racial animus).
46 See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993) (noting and sanctioning
district court’s distinction between personal animus and discriminatory animus).
47 See, e.g., Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing when personal animus does and does not equate to discriminatory animus); see also Sanches
v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647
F.3d 156, 165-66 (5th Cir. 2011) (differentiating personal animus and sex-based animus).
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48

iation. In those areas, the limitations on recovery may limit the advancement of women and help preserve the achievement gap.
A. Sexual Harassment
49

Title VII remedies a significant amount of sexual harassment.
However, sexual harassing conduct is non-compensable in two instances. First, sexually harassing conduct may not be considered seri50
ous enough to be actionable. Second, sexually harassing conduct that
is actionable sexual harassment may be subject to an affirmative de51
fense that absolves the employer of responsibility.
Two forms of actionable sexual harassment exist under Title VII:
harassment that causes actual job detriment and harassment that does
52
not cause actual job detriment. Historically, the forms have been
denoted “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” harassment,
53
respectively. Though those terms have fallen somewhat out of favor
54
recently, they are used in this article for ease of reference. Quid pro
quo harassment is harassing conduct undertaken because of the employee’s sex that explicitly alters an employee’s TCP of employment; it
is always compensable under Title VII. A prototypical quid pro quo
claim can consist of the following: a demand for sexual favors by a
supervisor, a subordinate’s refusal of the demand, and the firing of the
subordinate. Actual job detriment must occur and must be causally
55
related to the harassing conduct. For example, a supervisor’s demand
for sexual favors coupled with the subordinate’s refusal of the demand
is not considered quid pro quo harassment until the subordinate suf56
fers actual job detriment. Until actual job detriment occurs, the su-

48 See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., A Unifying Theory of Sex Discrimination, 34 GA. L. REV.
1591 (2000) (discussing limitations of sexual harassment law); Charles A. Sullivan, Raising The
Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. L. REV. 499, 537 n.164 (2010) [hereinafter Raising the Dead?].
49 For a discussion of the breadth of sexual harassment law, see generally, Chambers, supra
note 48.
50 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998) (“For any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe
or pervasive.”); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (“Of course . . . not all workplace conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of
employment within the meaning of Title VII.”); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17
(1993) (discussing limit of hostile work environment harassment).
51 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
52 For a general discussion of hostile work environment harassment, see id. at 751-53.
53 Id. at 751.
54 Indeed, the Ellerth Court essentially abandoned the terms as it discussed the terms’
genesis. See id. at 753.
55 See Chambers, supra note 48, at 1611-16 (discussing quid pro quo claim).
56 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.
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pervisor’s behavior will be analyzed as hostile work environment harassment.
Hostile work environment harassment is harassing conduct undertaken because of the employee’s sex that constructively alters the
terms, conditions or privileges of an employee’s employment. To be
actionable as hostile work environment harassment, the sexually harassing conduct must be severe or pervasive, objectively offensive to a
reasonable person, subjectively offensive to the employee, and unwel57
come. The severe or pervasive requirement is based on the belief
that relatively low-level or relatively infrequent sex-based harassment
58
may not constructively alter the TCP of an employee’s employment.
The objective offense requirement is an attempt to guarantee that a
supposedly overly sensitive employee cannot claim harm when other
reasonable employees would not. The subjective offense requirement
is based on the notion that an employee who is not personally offended by the harassing conduct cannot have suffered a constructive alteration of the employee’s TCP of employment. The unwelcomeness
requirement exists to guarantee that the employee does not enjoy the
harassing conduct, as courts posit could theoretically be the case when
the harassing conduct merely suggests sexual attraction – rather than
59
sexual animus – on the harasser’s part.
A significant amount of harassing conduct may occur before it is
60
actionable. Harassing conduct that falls short of hostile work environment harassment is not compensable under Title VII. Even if such
behavior is not common in the workplace, leaving that behavior noncompensable when it does arise in the workplace is problematic. Allowing harassing conduct to go unaddressed can be harmful if that
allows the workplace to become sexualized up to a point just short of
61
a hostile work environment. When such an environment is accepted
and acceptable, the unwillingness to accede to harassing behavior that
does not quite constitute actionable sexual harassment may mark an
employee as a prude who is not sufficiently in tune with the workplace

57 For general discussion of the requirements of an actionable hostile work environment
claim, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile Environment,
53 ALA. L. REV. 733, 740-43 (2002) [hereinafter (Un)Welcome Conduct].
58 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that Title VII is not to become “a general civility
code.” See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
59 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986) (discussing the relationship
between supposedly provocative dress and welcomeness of harassing conduct); Chambers,
(Un)Welcome Conduct, supra note 57, at 746.
60 See Chambers, (Un)Welcome Conduct, supra note 57, at 751-57 (discussing cases in
which sexually harassing conduct was not deemed actionable).
61 See Chambers, (Un)Welcome Conduct, supra note 57, at 783-84.
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to be promoted. If this situation tends to limit women more than men,
it might help explain the achievement gap.
Unfortunately, not only does Title VII allow some sexually harassing behavior to be rendered non-actionable because it has yet to
cause sufficient harm to an employee, Title VII allows some actionable
sexual harassment to be rendered non-compensable based on the Su62
preme Court’s installation of an affirmative defense. The affirmative
defense exists ostensibly to make sure that the employer is not held
responsible for sexual harassment when it would supposedly be unfair
63
to do so. The Supreme Court created an affirmative defense that
applies when a supervisor is responsible for harassing conduct that
64
creates a hostile work environment. The affirmative defense allows
an employer to avoid liability if the employer reasonably attempted to
prevent or remedy the harassing conduct and the employee unreason65
ably failed to address the harassment to minimize its effect. The affirmative defense may be fair and defensible given that employers
who attempt to prevent harassment may not be able to do so completely. Providing an opportunity for such employers to avoid liability
when a supervisor breaks company policy and an employee unreasonably fails to complain about the harassment may be fair. Indeed, the
affirmative defense provides employers the incentive to create serious
complaint procedures that would trigger the affirmative defense. That
is laudable if the complaint procedures create a culture of compliance
that lessens the incidence of workplace harassment. However, even
with such procedures in place, potentially harmful and noncompensable sexual harassment may exist. Indeed, the affirmative
defense is not necessary until actionable hostile work environment
harassment has occurred. Proof of the affirmative defense may
demonstrate that the employee could have sought to remedy or avoid
additional harassment once harassment occurred, but did not. However, it does not eliminate the existence of sexually harassing conduct
in the workplace that may harm an employee’s advancement.
The issue is even starker when the harassment is triggered by coworkers or other non-supervisory personnel. In that situation, the
employer must be negligent in failing to prevent or address the har-

62

See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
See id. at 764 (noting that the affirmative defense was crafted to support Title VII’s goals
of encouraging employers to be proactive in addressing harassment).
64 See id. at 765 (providing context for the affirmative defense).
65 See id. (“The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”).
63
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66

assment to be liable. Again, this is not necessarily a bad or unfair
standard. However, it has the potential to leave significant harassment non-compensable. If such harassment tends to fall more heavily
on female employees than male employees, that the harassment is
non-compensable may help explain the achievement gap.
Similarly, courts limit employer liability for the unofficial backlash that an employee may receive from fellow employees after chal67
lenging workplace sexual harassment. When fellow employees shun
an employee who has complained, the employer may avoid responsibility for the behavior of the fellow employees. Given that Title VII
addresses employer liability, this may be sensible. However, the result
may tend to discourage employees from complaining about sexual
harassment until it becomes intolerable. That may leave some tolera68
ble harassment unaddressed. Tolerable harassment can act as a
headwind that female employees may disproportionately face. Similar
issues arise when courts address retaliation under Title VII.
B.

Retaliation

Retaliation is different than most of the other issues this essay
discusses because Title VII does not explicitly limit recovery to retaliation that affects an employee’s TCP of employment. Title VII simply
69
prohibits retaliation. That would appear to allow courts to make every instance of retaliation compensable. However, courts have not
70
done so. Some retaliatory conduct that could be covered by Title
VII’s retaliation clause is not actionable. If that style of retaliation
falls more heavily on women than men, it could help explain the
achievement gap.
Title VII’s retaliation provision prohibits discrimination by an
employer against an employee who has formally participated in an
action alleging unlawful employment practices or who has informally
66 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998) (discussing negligence
standard).
67 See Chambers, (Un)Welcome Conduct, supra note 57, at 785 (noting that reprisals may
follow filing of harassment claim). Indeed, retaliation cases can begin with a reprisal stemming
from the filing of a sexual harassment claim. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
548 U.S. 53, 58 (2006).
68 However, harassment need not necessarily cause serious emotional distress to be actionable. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
69 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”).
70 See White, 548 U.S. at 60-61 (discussing how trial and appellate courts had addressed and
limited Title VII retaliation claims).
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opposed an unlawful employment practice. The retaliation provision
does not require that the employer harm the employee’s employment;
72
it bars discrimination based on the employee’s actions. The discriminatory conduct is deemed retaliatory if there is a sufficient causal
connection between the employee’s involvement in the challenge to
the unlawful employment practice and the subsequent discrimination
73
or differential treatment. Though Title VII’s text does not limit the
retaliation that is covered, courts have.
The Supreme Court set the limits of actionable retaliation in Bur74
lington Northern v. White. As the White Court noted, before White,
75
courts had argued about the scope of the retaliation clause. Some
had ruled that actionable retaliation had to be limited to retaliation
that concerned serious employment decisions. Other courts argued
that retaliation had to be limited to retaliation that affected an employee’s TCP of employment. Still other courts argued that retaliation
should extend to any discrimination that might dissuade a reasonable
76
employee from challenging the unlawful employment practice. The
White Court embraced a relatively broad view of the retaliation clause
and ruled that the clause covered retaliation that would dissuade a
reasonable employee from challenging the putative unlawful em77
ployment practice.
Though the White Court’s decision was a victory for those who
contemplated a fairly broad vision of retaliation, the decision did not
expand the retaliation clause to cover all retaliation. Retaliation that
would not deter a reasonable employee from challenging the putative
unlawful employment practice, but might cause harm to the employee’s employment, is not covered. An employer can treat an employee
who has challenged an unlawful employment practice badly, if the retaliation is insufficiently severe to deter the employee from challenging the unlawful employment practice. That may be a reasonable interpretation of Title VII. However, it leaves some harmful retaliation
non-compensable.

71 Courts arguably have broadened Title VII’s coverage by deeming it to cover actions that
employees reasonably believe to be unlawful employment practices. Others argue that courts
have not broadened coverage sufficiently because they may use the reasonable belief standard to
limit retaliation claims. For a discussion of reasonable belief, see Richard Moberly, The Supreme
Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375 (2010).
72 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
73 For a discussion of causation issues, see B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439,
456-59 (2008).
74 See White, 548 U.S. at 67-68.
75 Id. at 57.
76 Id. at 60-61 (discussing state of the law prior to the White decision).
77 Id.
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As importantly, co-worker retaliation is not compensable unless it
can be attributed to the employer. An employee who is shunned, insulted or treated badly by co-workers after challenging workplace
78
discrimination may have no recompense for that retaliation. The
79
retaliation may be bad enough. However, the employee may face
additional fallout when advancement opportunities become available.
If an employee’s relationship with the employee’s co-workers is considered relevant to a promotion, the employee’s opportunities to advance may be affected by the initial decision to challenge the unlawful
employment practice and the ensuing co-worker reaction. The employer cannot decline to promote the employee because of the employee’s prior challenge to the unlawful employment practice, but can
take co-worker opinion regarding the employee into account when
80
making promotion decisions.
Of course, even if the employee
claimed that the promotion decision amounted to retaliation by the
employer, the employee would need to prove that the promotion denial was causally related to the prior challenge to the unlawful employment practice. That can be difficult to prove given that courts
suggest that even a short time lag can destroy the causal link between
the challenge to an unlawful employment practice and an employment
81
decision that an employee claims is retaliatory.
Retaliation and sexual harassment are covered by Title VII.
However, both retaliation and sexual harassment have been interpreted more narrowly than Title VII requires. Though courts may be right
to interpret Title VII fairly narrowly, narrow interpretations broaden
the scope of workplace discrimination that is non-compensable. If
non-compensable behavior tends to harm women’s job prospects for
advancement more than men’s, the lack of coverage for that behavior
can help to explain the persistent achievement gap between men and
women in the workplace.

78 See Johnson v. Weld Cnty., Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1216 (10th Cir. 2010); George, supra note
73, at 482-83.
79 Retaliatory shunning is not uncommon. See, e.g., Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1216; Brazoria
Cnty., Tex. v. E.E.O.C., 391 F.3d 685, 691 (5th Cir. 2004).
80 Though the Supreme Court has determined that the ultimate decisionmaker need not be
motivated by discrimination for its decision to be sufficiently influenced by another’s discriminatory input to be actionable, see Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192-93 (2011), the application of that principle from a USERRA case to a Title VII retaliation situation would likely be
novel.
81 See, e.g., Gonzalez-Droz v. Gonzalez-Colon, 660 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that
proximity in timing between retaliation and triggering action must be close to support inference
of causation).
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V. CONCLUSION
The persistence of the achievement gap between men and women
in the workplace may be explained, in part, by the continued prevalence of sex discrimination in the workplace. Title VII remedies much,
but not all, sex discrimination in the workplace. Title VII’s limited
substantive coverage coupled with judicial interpretations that narrow
its coverage help explain the gap. Those interpretations leave women
vulnerable to sex discrimination that might slow their progress in the
workplace. If the harm from workplace sex discrimination that is not
covered by Title VII falls more heavily on women, women have a
headwind, either slight or severe, in the workplace. If women and men
provide work of equal quality, women will tend to advance more slowly because of the headwind. A resulting achievement gap is not surprising.
Unfortunately, larger problems may loom. The existing gap may
not be able to be closed even by the best and most aggressive enforcement of the employment discrimination laws. Though Title VII
may be expanded to cover additional forms of discrimination, Title
VII is unlikely to be expanded to cover all workplace discrimination
that could harm women’s advancement in the workplace. Eliminating
the behavior that leads to non-compensable workplace harm (or making sure that the harm is equally distributed to men and women) may
be the only hope of closing the gap. Employers will need to address
that issue on their own, assuming they want to solve it. However, employers have always been free to solve workplace problems on their
own. That employers have not done so already might make some pessimistic about whether they will move in that direction fast enough in
the near future to close the achievement gap.
This brief essay is not meant to be a comprehensive exploration
of the reasons that the workplace achievement gap between men and
women exists. For example, it does not discuss statutes other than Title VII. Indeed, it does not mention all of the discrimination that Title
VII does not cover. It does not analyze the effects of Title VII’s short
82
statute of limitations and limited monetary recovery. It does not consider how the EEOC may under-enforce Title VII. This essay merely
notes that Title VII is not an employment discrimination cure-all.
Simply, Title VII – a principal statute meant to address sex discrimination in the workplace – does not provide recompense for some forms
of harmful workplace discrimination. That alone may help to explain
the existence and persistence of an achievement gap.

82

See Sullivan, Raising the Dead?, supra note 48.

